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SMALL GESTURES AND UNEXPECTED
CONSEQUENCES: TEXTUALIST
INTERPRETATIONS OF STATE
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AFTER BOSTOCK V.
CLAYTON COUNTY
Anastasia E. Lacina*
The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton
County expanded Title VII’s coverage of victims of sex discrimination in
employment by interpreting the statute to also protect LGBTQ+ employees
who were discriminated against because of their sexual orientation and/or
gender identity. Although Bostock only applies precedentially to Title VII,
the long and interwoven history of state antidiscrimination statutes shows
that the ruling may reach beyond federal law.
This Note examines state court cases that have considered whether to
apply Bostock’s reasoning to the interpretation of state antidiscrimination
statutes. Furthermore, this Note argues in favor of a path forward in state
courts for expanding LGBTQ+ legal protections. The textualist reasoning
of Bostock’s opinion—whether perceived or actual—should be highly
persuasive to state court jurists, especially those in conservative states,
which are more likely to have textualist judges. Adopting Bostock at the state
level has the potential to expand crucial legal rights and protections for
millions of LGBTQ+ people.
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INTRODUCTION
Sometimes small gestures can have unexpected consequences. Major
initiatives practically guarantee them . . . . [T]he limits of the drafters’
imagination supply no reason to ignore the law’s demands. 1

In 2018, Amanda Sims, an employee of Tarrant County in Fort Worth,
Texas, came out as a lesbian to her supervisor of three years.2 The story that
followed is one that is familiar to many LGBTQ+ people. First, she began
to receive explicitly hostile treatment from her supervisor.3 Then, her
employer unexpectedly audited her for improper spending, which revealed
no impropriety.4 After she reported suspected employment discrimination to
a city commission on human relations, Sims was placed on administrative
leave.5 Finally, in July 2019, Sims was fired for what she alleged were
pretextual reasons.6 When Sims sued her employer in Texas state court, she

1. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
2. Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Request for Disclosure at 2, Sims v. Tarrant Cnty.
Coll. Dist., No. DC-19-18217 (Tex. Dist. Feb. 21, 2020), 2019 WL 6117844.
3. Id. at 2–3 (noting that Sims’s supervisor stated that “[she had] to overlook [her] bias
when it [came] to [Sims]”).
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2–3.
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did not include a claim under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act,7
which bans discrimination because of sex but not sexual orientation.8
Instead, she sued under the Texas state constitution.9 But while the case was
on appeal, the legal landscape drastically changed for Amanda Sims and for
every LGBTQ+ employee in the United States.10
In June 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6–3 in Bostock v. Clayton
County11 that federal law protected LGBTQ+ people from employment
discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation and gender identity.12
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,13 covered employers are
prohibited from discriminating against their employees “because of . . .
sex.”14 Focusing almost solely on the text of Title VII,15 Justice Gorsuch,
writing for the majority, crafted a unique legal opinion, which held that Title
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination also prohibited discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.16
In the time since Bostock, many courts at both the federal and state levels
have grappled with the consequences of the decision.17 Bostock’s
interpretive holding only applies precedentially to Title VII, which regulates
only certain types of employers and employees.18
But state
antidiscrimination laws can provide stronger protections by covering more
employees and offering broader remedies to claimants.19 Additionally, it was
unclear whether Bostock’s reasoning could apply to nonemployment
antidiscrimination statutes, on either the state or federal level.20 Thus, claims
like Amanda Sims’s—which was brought under state antidiscrimination
laws—were placed in legal limbo.21 If the Bostock decision influences state
courts’ interpretations of state law, it could expand legal protections for
7. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.051–21.061 (West 2021).
8. See Sims v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., No. DC-19-18217, 2020 WL 9594341, at *2
(Tex. Dist. Feb. 21, 2020), rev’d in part, 621 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App. 2021).
9. Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Request for Disclosure, supra note 2, at 2.
10. See Sims, 621 S.W.3d at 328 (noting that four months after the Texas trial court
entered its order, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bostock).
11. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
12. Id. at 1737.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
14. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
15. See infra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.
16. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
17. See infra Parts II.A–C. At least one circuit court has expanded Bostock’s ruling to
apply to cases about Title IX and federally funded education. See Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty.
Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616 (4th Cir. 2020) (“After the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Bostock . . . we have little difficulty holding that a bathroom policy precluding [plaintiff] from
using the boys restrooms discriminated against him ‘on the basis of sex.’”).
18. See infra notes 75–76, 79 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
20. Although state courts have addressed Bostock’s applicability to nonemployment
antidiscrimination statutory provisions, see infra Parts II.B–C, this Note often uses state and
federal employment law as representative of antidiscrimination law as a whole. Scholarship
in this area is often focused on employment law. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 25, 32, 54.
21. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 5, Love v. Young, 320 So. 3d 259 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2021) (No. 1D18-2844) (responding to the appellate court’s order to submit a
supplemental brief addressing the potential effects of Bostock on the case before it).
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millions of LGBTQ+ people living in states without explicit statutory
protections.22
Part I of this Note first situates Bostock in the history of antidiscrimination
law in the United States, before examining the reasoning of the majority and
dissenting opinions. Part II assesses how state courts have applied or not
applied Bostock to state antidiscrimination statutes that are analogous to Title
VII. Part III lays out arguments for both sides of the issue that state courts
now face: whether to apply Bostock’s reasoning to their own state
antidiscrimination laws. Finally, Part IV argues in favor of Bostock’s
applicability to state antidiscrimination statutes.
I. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW: A PATCHWORK QUILT
The Bostock decision rests on decades of judicial precedent and statutory
civil rights law,23 and it cannot be fully understood without an examination
of those historical developments. Part I.A discusses the history of federal
antidiscrimination law, with a focus on the Civil Rights Act of 196424 (“1964
Act”). Part I.B examines state antidiscrimination laws, as well as the current
state landscape for LGBTQ+ legal protections. Part I.C examines the
Bostock opinion in depth and situates it within the current political and legal
context.
A. A History of Federal Antidiscrimination Law
Statutory antidiscrimination law is a relatively recent phenomenon in the
United States.25 Despite the Civil War amendments26 and Reconstruction
laws27 during the mid-nineteenth century, the modern statutory framework
for federal antidiscrimination law began with the 1964 Act.28 The 1964 Act
and its amendments prohibit discrimination “because of” race, color,
religion, national origin, and sex in federally funded education29 (Title IX)
and private employment30 (Title VII). The 1964 Act also prohibits
discrimination in public accommodations because of race, color, religion,
22. CHRISTY MALLORY ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR LGBT PEOPLE AFTER BOSTOCK V.
CLAYTON COUNTY 1–2 (2020), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/
Bostock-State-Laws-Jul-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8SM-TY3D].
23. See infra Part I.A; see also Marc Spindelman, Bostock’s Paradox: Textualism, Legal
Justice, and the Constitution, 69 BUFF. L. REV. 553, 598–99 (2021).
24. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28, 42,
and 52 U.S.C.).
25. See Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent
Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469,
477 (2006).
26. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
27. See, e.g., Ku Klux Klan Act, Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
28. See Landmark Legislation: The Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilRightsAct1964.htm
[https://perma.cc/3BJ3-MKN2] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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and national origin, but not sex (Title II).31 Although a small number of
states passed limited antidiscrimination statutes before the 1964 Act,32
Congress was the driving force in the new field of statutory
antidiscrimination law.33
Since the 1964 Act, Congress has passed a variety of additional
antidiscrimination protections. For example, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 196734 expanded Title VII employment protections to
age discrimination,35 whereas the Americans with Disabilities Act of 199036
expanded both employment and public accommodation protections to people
with disabilities.37 As a result, antidiscrimination law on the federal level is
somewhat fractured and scattered across a variety of statutory provisions.38
Sexual orientation and gender identity are not explicitly named protected
characteristics under the 1964 Act or its amendments.39 Congress has not
yet passed any amendments or comprehensive statutes to protect LGBTQ+
people from discrimination.40 Consequently, most progress on LGBTQ+
civil rights at the federal level has come from federal courts, especially the
Supreme Court.41 For example, in Romer v. Evans,42 the Court struck down
a discriminatory state constitutional amendment,43 holding that the

31. Id. § 2000a(a).
32. See Sandra F. Sperino, Revitalizing State Employment Discrimination Law, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 545, 558 (2013) (noting that Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania
prohibited racial discrimination in employment before the federal government).
33. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 708 (1979) (“Since the Civil War, the
Federal Government and the federal courts have been the ‘primary and powerful reliances’ in
protecting citizens against . . . discrimination.” (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
464 (1974))). In Cannon, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the subject matter of
Title IX—antidiscrimination in education—was an area of concern suited to the states. Id.
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634.
35. Id. § 623(a).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.
37. Id. §§ 12112(a), 12182(a).
38. See Sperino, supra note 32, at 546–47.
39. See MALLORY, supra note 22, at 4–5.
40. See Equality Act, H.R. 5, 117th Cong. §§ 3–7, 10 (as passed by House, Feb. 25, 2021)
(preventing discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity in public
accommodations, education, employment, and housing). The Equality Act has not yet been
passed by the Senate. Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Pride Month Concludes Without Equality Act
Vote in Senate, THE HILL (July 1, 2021, 8:11 AM), https://thehill.com/business-alobbying/561060-pride-month-concludes-without-equality-act-vote-in-senate
[https://perma.cc/GEM9-XUHR].
41. See LAMBDA LEGAL, WHY FEDERAL COURTS MATTER TO THE LGBT COMMUNITY
1–2 (2012), https://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/fs_whyfederal-courts-matter-to-the-lgbt-community.pdf [https://perma.cc/S88M-YP5D].
The
Supreme Court’s LGBTQ+ jurisprudence has evolved and built upon itself over the past
twenty-five years. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 562, 578–79 (2003) (striking down anti-sodomy statutes as unconstitutional); United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 749–52 (2013) (holding that same-sex spouses must be
treated as spouses for purposes of federal law); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2607–08 (2015) (finding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage).
42. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
43. This amendment prohibited all state and local governments from enacting legislation
to protect LGBTQ+ Americans. See id. at 624 (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (1992)).
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amendment unconstitutionally singled out LGBTQ+ people and imposed a
burden on them.44 In doing so, the Court recognized a legal principle that
LGBTQ+ people should be afforded the same basic rights as cis-heterosexual
people.45
B. The Current State Law Landscape
Since the nation’s founding, states have had the power to regulate sexual
and marital relationships.46 In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to
legalize same-sex marriage when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that its state constitution guaranteed same-sex couples the right to
marry.47 In the years that followed, other states exhibited both backlash and
progress: while at least ten states also legalized same-sex marriage, over
thirty states passed laws or constitutional amendments prohibiting it.48 After
same-sex marriage was legalized nationwide,49 LGBTQ+ activists shifted
their focus to address other areas of law, such as conversion therapy,50
transgender health-care coverage,51 and antidiscrimination statutes.52
Currently, all fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico, have at least one sex discrimination statute on the books.53 Forty-seven
states prohibit private employment discrimination on the basis of sex,54
forty-five states prohibit sex discrimination in public accommodations,55 and
forty-nine states prohibit sex discrimination in housing.56 In contrast, only
twenty-one states have full protections for LGBTQ+ people—based on
sexual orientation and gender identity—in employment, public

44. See id. at 631–33.
45. See Spindelman, supra note 23, at 607–09.
46. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568–69. Laws against sodomy and buggery existed during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but were rarely enforced in the United States. Id. In
the 1970s, some states began to single out same-sex sodomy for prosecution, but most
continued to only enforce sodomy statutes for public homosexual conduct. See id. at 570–71.
47. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
48. See Brandon Gee, Remembering “Goodridge,” MASS. LAWS. WKLY. (May 9, 2013),
https://masslawyersweekly.com/2013/05/09/remembering-goodridge/
[https://perma.cc/P9P6-HBYM].
49. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
50. See Conversion “Therapy” Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/conversion_therapy [https://perma.cc/Y4QA-4ZPL]
(Feb. 15, 2022).
51. See Healthcare Laws and Policies, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies/
youth_medical_care_bans [https://perma.cc/PQL2-RLMH] (Feb. 15, 2022).
52. See Snapshot: LGBTQ Equality by State, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/ [https://perma.cc/S6MT-RGK6] (Feb. 15, 2022).
53. See Iris Hentze & Rebecca Tyus, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, NAT’L CONF.
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-andemployment/sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace.aspx [https://perma.cc/2LHF-PARB].
54. James M. Oleske, Jr., “State Inaction,” Equal Protection, and Religious Resistance
to LGBT Rights, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 45 n.155 (2016) (all states but Alabama, Georgia, and
Mississippi).
55. Id. (all states but Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas).
56. Id. (all states but Wyoming).
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accommodations, and housing.57 This leaves a significant coverage gap:
twenty-nine states do not have full statutory antidiscrimination protections
for LGBTQ+ people.58
This disparity between state laws has major consequences: although state
law is similar to federal law in many ways,59 there are nevertheless important
historical and legal differences between federal and state frameworks that
can lead to different legal analyses and outcomes.60 Unlike federal
antidiscrimination law, which is scattered across many statutory provisions,61
many states have omnibus antidiscrimination laws, which include all
protected traits within one “statutory regime.”62 For example, New York’s
antidiscrimination statute is structured in a way that is standard for state
antidiscrimination laws.63 New York’s main statutory provision64 is divided
into two relevant parts: Subsection (1) guarantees the right to be free from
employment discrimination “because of age, race, creed, color, national
origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex,
marital status, or disability.”65 Subsection (2) guarantees the same rights, for
the same protected characteristics, in education, public accommodations, and
housing.66 Whereas New York’s main antidiscrimination statutory provision
is contained within two subsections,67 the equivalent federal statutory
protections (where they exist) are scattered across at least eleven separate
57. See LGBTQ Americans Aren’t Fully Protected from Discrimination in 29 States,
FREEDOM FOR ALL AMS., https://freedomforallamericans.org/states/ [https://perma.cc/8W48GBSM] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022). Of these twenty-nine states, Utah is unique in that it has
some statutory protections for LGBTQ+ people in housing and employment but not in public
accommodations. Utah: LGBTQ Non-Discrimination in the States, FREEDOM FOR ALL AMS.,
https://freedomforallamericans.org/category/ut/ [https://perma.cc/JD5D-86VR] (last visited
Mar. 4, 2022).
58. LGBTQ Americans Aren’t Fully Protected from Discrimination in 29 States, supra
note 57. The twenty-nine states are as follows: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Id. See Sperino, supra note 32, at 557 n.109, for a list of all fifty states’ employment
discrimination statutes.
59. See infra notes 83–86.
60. See generally Sperino, supra note 32.
61. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
62. Sperino, supra note 32, at 560. States also differ in how many traits they protect from
discrimination. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(1) (McKinney 2021) (prohibiting
discrimination based on “age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, gender
identity or expression, military status, sex, marital status, or disability”), with ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-123-107(a) (2021) (prohibiting discrimination based on “race, religion, national origin,
gender, or . . . disability”).
63. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290–301 (McKinney 2021). New York’s antidiscrimination law
is one of the strongest in the United States. The New York State Human Rights Law: Your
Rights, RAPAPORT L., https://www.rapaportlaw.com/employment-law/the-new-york-statehuman-rights-law-your-rights/ [https://perma.cc/PG48-2RZX] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
64. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2021).
65. Id. § 291(1).
66. Id. § 291(2).
67. The entirety of New York’s antidiscrimination law is contained within sections 290–
301. See id. §§ 290–301.
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statutory provisions.68 Although there are exceptions to this generalization,69
state antidiscrimination laws are typically simpler and more self-contained
than their federal counterparts.70
There are also important linguistic differences between federal and state
antidiscrimination laws. For example, many state employment statutes do
not mirror Title VII’s two-part structure, which distinguishes between
disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.71 As discussed, state
statutes are often simpler in language and structure than their scattered
federal counterparts.72 State statutes may also employ slightly different
causality language: for instance, “on the grounds of” instead of “because
of,”73 or “gender” instead of “sex.”74
State antidiscrimination laws can also be more friendly to plaintiffs and
claimants than federal law.75 To use employment law as an example, Title
VII generally only applies to employers with more than fifteen employees
who have worked there for at least twenty weeks.76 In comparison, many
states’ employment statutes apply to much more of the workforce.77 For
instance, New York’s employment discrimination statute applies to every
employer in the state.78 In addition, damages for successful plaintiffs under
Title VII are capped at $50,000 for small businesses and $300,000 for the
largest corporations.79 Many states, in contrast, provide uncapped
68. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (sex in education); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (age in employment);
38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (military status in employment); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (race, color,
religion, and national origin in public accommodations); id. § 2000d (race, color, and national
origin in education); id. § 2000e-2(a) (race, color, religion, national origin, and sex in
employment); id. § 3604 (race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status, and
disability in housing); id. § 12112(a) (disability in employment); id. §§ 12131–12132
(disability in education); id. § 12182(a) (disability in public accommodations).
69. See Sperino, supra note 32, at 560–61 n.114 (listing omnibus state antidiscrimination
statutes and identifying states that have scattered statutory regimes).
70. See id. at 546.
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); see also Sperino, supra note 32, at 562–63.
72. See supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 760.08 (2021).
74. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.147b(1) (2022).
75. See Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law
Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REV.
97, 155–57 (2009).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); see also Coverage of Business/Private Employers, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/coverage-businessprivate-employers
[https://perma.cc/2SG4-CCBY] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022). The main exception is that age
discrimination claimants must work for an employer with at least twenty employees. 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b).
77. See Daniel Lewallen, Note, Follow the Leader: Why All States Should Remove
Minimum Employee Thresholds in Antidiscrimination Statutes, 47 IND. L. REV. 817, 821–22
(2014) (noting that twenty states have lowered the number of employees for employment
discrimination coverage, while fourteen states have employment discrimination laws which
cover all employers in the state).
78. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(5) (McKinney 2021). Beyond the statutory definition of
“employer,” New York courts typically consider four factors: (1) selection and engagement
of the employee, (2) the payment of a salary or wages, (3) power over dismissal, and (4) power
to control the employee’s conduct. Popat v. Levy, 253 F. Supp. 3d 527, 541 (W.D.N.Y. 2017).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); see Drummonds, supra note 75, at 156.

2022] SMALL GESTURES AND UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES

2401

compensatory damages—as well as punitive damages—for employment
discrimination.80 The opportunity for unlimited damages may incentivize
claimants to sue under their state antidiscrimination laws.81 In addition, if a
claimant’s employer is not covered by Title VII—for example, if the
employer does not have more than fifteen employees—a claimant may have
no choice but to sue under state law to obtain relief.82
Despite the many substantive and procedural differences between federal
and state antidiscrimination laws, state courts have traditionally interpreted
their own statutes in line with analogous federal law.83 Some state
legislatures have even included directives in the statutory text or legislative
history for the statute to be interpreted in line with federal law.84 In addition,
despite particular linguistic differences between federal and state law,85
antidiscrimination statutes have a similar structure: often, the area of targeted
discrimination (employment, public accommodations, etc.) is followed by a
causality clause (for example, “discrimination because of”) and a list of
protected characteristics.86
Other state courts have chosen to interpret their state statutes consistently
with federal law for public policy reasons such as uniformity and federal
deference.87 Reputational concerns by state judges may also predominate in
a decision: “[A] state judge, despite having the inherent authority to construe
a state statute in a manner inconsistent with federal law, may hesitate to
announce to the world that a majority of the country’s highest court got the
issue wrong.”88 Despite linguistic and structural differences between state
and federal laws, there are incentives for state judges to interpret state law to
be consistent with federal law.
C. Bostock v. Clayton County
For many years after Title VII’s enactment, federal courts had interpreted
the provision to not protect LGBTQ+ people based on sexual orientation or
80. See Drummonds, supra note 75, at 156. For example, New York allows uncapped
compensatory damages and punitive damages up to $10,000, as well as civil penalties and
injunctive relief for the claimant. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(4)(c) (McKinney 2021).
81. See, e.g., Kenton H. Steele & Melvin J. Davis, Application of Caps on Non-Economic
Damages in State and Federal Employment Claims, REMINGER (Feb. 2019),
https://www.reminger.com/publication-771 [https://perma.cc/B3DJ-HN5D].
82. See
Discrimination
Claims—State
Laws,
WORKPLACE
FAIRNESS,
https://www.workplacefairness.org/minimum [https://perma.cc/P2XJ-GYZA] (last visited
Mar. 4, 2022); see also MALLORY, supra note 22, at 8.
83. See Long, supra note 25, at 476–77 (“[S]tate courts have routinely adopted the federal
courts’ interpretations of parallel federal law with little or no independent analysis of the
applicable state statute.”).
84. See id. at 477 n.32 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-5-27 (West 2004)).
85. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text for a discussion of New York’s
antidiscrimination law as a typical example of a state antidiscrimination statute.
87. See Long, supra note 25, at 478–79; see also infra Part III.A.3. Among other things,
uniformity between federal and state courts on antidiscrimination law may reduce forum
shopping. See Long, supra note 25, at 478.
88. Long, supra note 25, at 479.
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gender identity.89 However, the Supreme Court had never addressed the
issue.90 In 2013, Gerald Bostock—a longtime child welfare advocate for
Clayton County, Georgia—joined a gay recreational softball league.91
Shortly after, he was fired from his job for “unbecoming” conduct.92 In a
similar case, Donald Zarda was fired as a skydiving instructor in New York
days after he mentioned he was gay.93 Aimee Stephens, a transgender
woman, presented as male when she was hired to work at a Michigan funeral
home.94 Six years later, she informed her employer that she was transgender
and would be transitioning.95 Shortly afterward, she was fired.96 All of these
plaintiffs sued for employment discrimination under Title VII, claiming that
they had been discriminated against because of their sex.97 In 2020, their
appeals were combined and heard by the Supreme Court in Bostock v.
Clayton County.98
In Bostock, the Supreme Court ruled 6–3 that Title VII’s prohibition
against sex discrimination includes discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity.99 Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch
used well-known tools of statutory interpretation100 to analyze the relevant
provision of Title VII:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.101

The Court construed “because of” to refer to a traditional but-for causation
test: “If the employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s
89. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1777–78 (2020) (Alito, J.,
dissenting), for a list of circuit courts that addressed the issue of sexual orientation or gender
identity discrimination under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit was the first federal appellate
court to reconsider the question and hold that discrimination based on sexual orientation was
covered by Title VII. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th
Cir. 2017).
90. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 340.
91. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
92. Id. at 1737–38.
93. Id. at 1738. Zarda sued under both Title VII and New York’s state antidiscrimination
law, but because a jury found in favor of his employer on the state law claim, Zarda was left
to argue only the Title VII claim on appeal. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100,
109–10 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731
(2020).
94. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1737–38.
99. See id. at 1736–37.
100. See id. at 1738 (discussing the “ordinary public meaning” of the statute); Diarmuid F.
O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 303, 307–08 (2017) (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of different methods
of statutory interpretation).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).
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sex when deciding to discharge the employee—put differently, if changing
the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer—
a statutory violation has occurred.”102
Justice Gorsuch laid out several hypotheticals of employees being fired
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity:
Consider, for example, an employer with two employees, both of whom are
attracted to men. The two individuals are, to the employer’s mind,
materially identical in all respects, except that one is a man and the other a
woman. If the employer fires the male employee for no reason other than
the fact he is attracted to men, the employer discriminates against him for
traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague.103

The same principle applied for transgender employees: if an employer has
two otherwise identical women—one assigned female at birth and one
assigned male at birth—and fires the employee assigned male at birth, then
the employer intentionally discriminated against that employee because of
her sex.104
For the Court, sexual orientation and gender identity are “inextricably
bound up with sex.”105 Thus, sex does not have to be the primary or sole
reason for discrimination but just one of many but-for causes.106 The Court
pointed to several Title VII precedents to support this reasoning.107 For
example, the Court pointed to Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,108 in which
the Court had ruled that an employer who rejected female applicants with
young children, but accepted male applicants with young children, violated
Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination.109 Although the employer
may have based its decision primarily on a separate criterion—the presence
of young children—the employee’s sex was nevertheless a but-for cause of
the discriminatory conduct.110 By analogy, even if a discriminatory
employer is motivated by the sex to which the employee is attracted, it does
not erase the fact that the employer also discriminated because of the
employee’s sex.111

102. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741. The Court noted that both parties disputed whether the
term “sex” in Title VII referred solely to biological characteristics (the employers’ view) or
whether it also included gender roles and norms (the employees’ view). Id. at 1739. However,
since “nothing in [its] approach to these cases turn[ed] on the outcome of the parties’ debate,”
the Court assumed a purely biological definition of sex. Id.
103. Id. at 1741.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1742. However, the Court also acknowledged that “homosexuality and
transgender status are distinct concepts from sex.” Id. at 1746–47.
106. Id. at 1743.
107. See id. at 1743–44.
108. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
109. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (citing Phillips, 400 U.S. 542).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1742 (“To be sure, [the] employer’s ultimate goal might be to discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation. But to achieve that purpose the employer must, along the way,
intentionally treat an employee worse based in part on that individual’s sex.”).
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The Bostock Court stated that it was only concerned with the law “as it
is”112 and rejected the employers’ arguments, which relied on the legislative
history of Title VII.113 The Court rejected the argument that congressional
intent should inform how courts interpret Title VII, stating that Congress’s
failure to amend Title VII to explicitly include sexual orientation and gender
identity is irrelevant.114 The Court’s opinion in Bostock is primarily
interested in the statutory text of Title VII—specifically the meanings of
“because of” and “sex”—and not the intentions or motivations of the
legislators who drafted it.115
The Court characterized its own opinion in Bostock as textualist.116 In the
years since Bostock, legal scholars, political pundits, and the public have
understood Bostock as a textualist opinion.117 However, Justice Alito in
dissent argued that the majority’s appeal to textualism was erroneous118 and
that the majority went beyond the bounds of Title VII by not using the
definition of “sex” at the time of Title VII’s adoption.119
Both the majority and dissent anticipated that Bostock may be used in ways
that go beyond Title VII and employment discrimination. The majority
disregarded the employers’ claim that the decision would “sweep beyond
Title VII to other federal or state laws,” saying that “none of these other laws
are before us . . . today.”120 Justice Alito, in his dissent, also identified over
112. Id. at 1745.
113. See id. at 1749 (“Ultimately, the employers are forced to abandon the statutory text
and precedent altogether and appeal to assumptions and policy.”).
114. Id. at 1747.
115. See id. at 1749. To support its textualist roots, the Court cited Justice Antonin Scalia’s
writings on statutory interpretation. Id. (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)).
116. See id. at 1749 (“[W]hen the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, our job is at an
end.”).
117. See Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 267
(2020) (describing Bostock’s reasoning as a type of “formalistic textualism,” which focuses
on “semantic context” and downplays “policy concerns or the practical (even monumental)
consequences of the case”); George T. Conway III, Why Scalia Should Have Loved the
Supreme Court’s Title VII Decision, WASH. POST (June 16, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/16/why-scalia-would-have-lovedsupreme-courts-title-vii-decision/ [https://perma.cc/3SEV-H4H3] (arguing that Bostock is a
“victory” for textualism); Katie Eyer, Symposium: Progressive Textualism and LGBTQ
Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (June 16, 2020, 10:23 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/
06/symposium-progressive-textualism-and-lgbtq-rights/
[https://perma.cc/GZ47-WT6E]
(arguing that Bostock’s “progressive textualism” is crucial for the future of civil rights law).
But see Spindelman, supra note 23, at 561 (discussing how Bostock may “self-present[] as a
textualist statutory interpretation ruling,” but “[d]espite Bostock’s painstaking care . . . the
Supreme Court’s pro-LGBT rights jurisprudence figures in the opinion in important ways”).
118. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755–56 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court attempts to pass
off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation
championed by our late colleague Justice Scalia, but no one should be fooled. The Court’s
opinion is like a pirate ship. It sails under a textualist flag, but what it actually represents is a
theory of statutory interpretation that Justice Scalia excoriated . . . .”). Justice Kavanaugh,
writing separately in dissent, called the majority opinion’s reasoning “literalist” rather than
“textualist.” See id. at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1753 (majority opinion).
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one hundred federal statutes121 that prohibit sex discrimination, as well as
other civil rights statutes—both federal and state—that mirror Title VII.122
In the aftermath of Bostock, some federal courts have applied Bostock’s
reasoning to Title IX, a parallel section of the 1964 Act that bans sex
discrimination in education.123 Some organizations also anticipated that
Bostock would have an effect on other statutes, including state
antidiscrimination laws.124
II. STATE COURT EXPANSION OF BOSTOCK
State courts are bound by Bostock’s interpretation of Title VII, just as
federal courts are.125 However, despite early speculation,126 it was unclear
whether states would defer to the Supreme Court and choose to apply
Bostock’s reasoning to areas of state law127—and if so, whether they would
limit Bostock’s application to employment law. Almost two years since
Bostock, several states with statutory provisions against sex discrimination—
but not against sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination—have
encountered the issue of how to apply Bostock’s reasoning to state law.128
State courts have encountered the issue not only in employment
discrimination cases but also in public accommodation and
ethnic-intimidation cases.129

121. Id. at 1791–96 (Alito, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1778.
123. See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616 (4th Cir. 2020)
(“After the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bostock . . . we have little difficulty holding
that a bathroom policy precluding [plaintiff] from using the boys restrooms discriminated
against him ‘on the basis of sex.’”); B.P.J. v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., No. 21-CV-00316,
2021 WL 3081883, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. July 21, 2021) (“[The school] could not exclude B.P.J.
[the transgender plaintiff] from a girls’ athletic team without referencing her ‘biological
sex’ . . . . Her sex ‘remains a but-for cause’ of her exclusion under the law.” (quoting Grimm,
972 F.3d at 616)). But see Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 3 F.4th 1299, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2021) (declining to reach the transgender plaintiff’s Title IX claim), reh’g en banc
granted, 9 F.4th 1369 (11th Cir. 2021).
124. See generally MALLORY, supra note 22 (studying state antidiscrimination laws and
estimating the number of LGBTQ+ people who could gain protections if those laws were
interpreted consistently with Bostock); Cathryn Oakley, What the Supreme Court Ruling in
Bostock Means for State Legislative Efforts, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (July 15, 2020),
https://www.hrc.org/news/what-the-supreme-court-ruling-in-bostock-means-for-statelegislative-effort [https://perma.cc/9FX8-LEUZ] (surveying areas of state law that could be
affected by Bostock).
125. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . .” (emphasis added)); Mondou v. N.Y., New
Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912) (“When Congress . . . adopt[s an] act, it
sp[eaks] for all the people and all the States . . . . That policy is as much the policy of [the
state] as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly
in the courts of the State.”).
126. See, e.g., supra note 124 and accompanying text (identifying organizations that
predicted Bostock’s effect on state law).
127. See MALLORY, supra note 22, at 4–6.
128. See infra Parts II.A–C.
129. See infra Parts II.A–C (discussing these cases).
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This part examines the implications of Bostock on the state level.
Specifically, it surveys the five state cases that have addressed the issue of
whether Bostock’s reasoning should apply to state antidiscrimination
statutes. Part II.A addresses two employment discrimination cases from
Texas and Ohio. Part II.B discusses two public accommodations cases from
Florida and Michigan. Finally, Part II.C considers one case involving an
ethnic-intimidation criminal statute from Michigan.
A. Employment Discrimination Cases
Texas was one of the first states to address Bostock’s applicability in a state
law context.
Texas’s state antidiscrimination statute—the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act130 (TCHRA)—provides, in part, that
“[a]n employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because of . . .
sex . . . the employer . . . discriminates . . . against an individual [in the terms
of employment].”131 The TCHRA explicitly states that the purpose of the
law is, inter alia, to “provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”132
In February 2020, Amanda Sims sued her employer under the Texas state
constitution for firing her because of her sexual orientation.133 She did not
make a claim under the TCHRA, which both parties agreed did not prohibit
sexual orientation discrimination.134 But while her case was on appeal, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Bostock.135 Eventually, in Tarrant County
College District v. Sims,136 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit of Texas
at Dallas held that the TCHRA’s prohibition against sex discrimination also
prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity,
“[i]n light of Bostock.”137 The court reasoned that since no Texas state court
had weighed in on the issue of whether the TCHRA covered LGBTQ+
discrimination, it would look to analogous federal law for guidance.138 The
court noted that both Title VII and the TCHRA prohibited employment
discrimination “because of . . . sex.”139
After analyzing Bostock’s
reasoning,140 the court concluded that it “must follow Bostock” in order to
“reconcile and conform the TCHRA with federal anti-discrimination”

130. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.051–21.061 (West 2021).
131. Id. § 21.051 (emphasis added).
132. Id. § 21.001(1).
133. See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text.
134. See Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist. v. Sims, 621 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tex. App. 2021).
135. See id. at 328.
136. 621 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App. 2021).
137. Id. at 329.
138. See id. at 328.
139. See id. (alteration in original).
140. The court specifically quoted an excerpt from Bostock emphasizing the importance of
the text of Title VII: “When the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual
considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law, and all
persons are entitled to its benefit.” Id. at 329 (quoting Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct.
1731, 1737 (2020)).
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laws.141 In reaching the conclusion that it “must” conform with Bostock, the
court emphasized the purpose of the TCHRA—to “coordinate and conform”
with federal antidiscrimination laws—and precedent from the Texas
Supreme Court, which had looked to federal courts for guidance when the
TCHRA and Title VII had similar language.142
In another case, an Ohio state court recognized, in dicta, the potential
applicability of Bostock to Ohio state law.143 Ohio’s antidiscrimination
statute has language almost identical to both Texas’s law and Title VII: Ohio
also prohibits discrimination in employment “because of . . . sex.”144 In
Nance v. Lima Auto Mall, Inc.,145 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Appellate District of Ohio upheld a trial court’s dismissal of a claim under
Ohio’s antidiscrimination statute for lack of facts to sustain a claim.146
However, in dicta, the court addressed the applicability of Bostock to Ohio’s
antidiscrimination law.147 Citing Ohio case law asserting that federal
antidiscrimination law is generally applicable when interpreting Ohio state
antidiscrimination law,148 the court stated that a claim of sexual orientation
discrimination in Ohio “could potentially have a basis in law under
Bostock.”149
B. Public Accommodations Cases
Although Bostock itself is limited to employment discrimination under
Title VII, some courts—both state and federal—have applied Bostock’s
reasoning to other areas of antidiscrimination law with similar statutory
schemes.150 One of these areas is discrimination in public accommodations,
which is regulated on the federal level by Title II of the 1964 Act.151
The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992152 (FCRA) prohibits, in part,
discrimination in places of public accommodation “on the ground of . . .
sex.”153 In Love v. Young,154 the First District Court of Appeal of Florida
declined to address the issue of whether the FCRA also prohibits

141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. See id. at 328.
143. Nance v. Lima Auto Mall, Inc., No. 1-19-54, 2020 WL 3412268, at *26 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 22, 2020).
144. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (West 2021).
145. No. 1-19-54, 2020 WL 3412268 (Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 2020).
146. See id. at *26.
147. See id.
148. Id. at *25.
149. Id. at *26.
150. See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616 (4th Cir. 2020)
(applying Bostock to a transgender student’s Title IX claim for discrimination in public school
bathrooms because of his gender identity); Rouch World, LLC v. Mich. Dep’t of C.R., No.
20-000145-MZ, slip op. at 7 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Dec. 7, 2020) (applying Bostock to a state public
accommodations statute), appeal granted, 961 N.W.2d 153 (Mich. 2021) (mem.).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
152. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01–760.11 (2021).
153. Id. § 760.08.
154. 320 So. 3d 259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
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discrimination based on gender identity.155 In a divided plurality opinion,156
the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that a club discriminated against her in
violation of the FCRA when performers of a male exotic dancer club refused
to dance for her because she was transgender.157 Both the trial and appellate
courts held that even if the FCRA prohibited gender identity discrimination,
the club’s defense of the performers’ “right to be protected from unwanted
sexual touching” trumped the plaintiff’s claim under the FCRA.158
Dissenting from the plurality opinion, Judge Ross L. Bilbrey argued in
favor of Bostock’s applicability to the FCRA, even in public
accommodations cases.159 Judge Bilbrey cited opinions from the Florida
Commission on Human Relations160 (FCHR), the purpose of the FCRA,161
and Florida case law162 to show that applying Bostock to the FCRA was
consistent with Florida law.163 Although the plurality dismissed the dissent’s
reasoning as dicta,164 Judge Bilbrey also noted that because of the fractured
nature of the panel’s plurality opinion, Love establishes no binding precedent
in Florida.165
In Michigan, the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act166 (ELCRA) forbids the
denial of the “full and equal enjoyment of . . . public service because of . . .
sex.”167 Like in Title VII, “sex” is not defined in the ELCRA, so Michigan
courts have interpreted its meaning over the past forty years.168 In Barbour
v. Department of Social Services169—a pre-Bostock case—a Michigan
appellate court held that sexual orientation does not fall under the definition

155. Id. at 260. Although the appellate court asked the parties to submit supplemental
briefs on the effect of Bostock on the case, the plurality did not address Bostock directly in its
opinion. Id. at 260 n.1.
156. In a panel of three judges, Judge Susan L. Kelsey wrote the plurality, Judge Lori S.
Rowe concurred in result only, and Judge Ross L. Bilbrey dissented. See id. at 259.
157. See id. at 260–61. Management asked the plaintiff to move to another seat in the same
section after the performers were told that there was a “man dressed as a woman” in the
audience. Id. at 261.
158. See id. at 262–63.
159. Id. at 271–74 (Bilbrey, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 272 n.15 (noting that the FCHR recently promulgated a policy stating that
gender identity and sexual orientation are covered under the FCRA but that that policy
receives “no deference” from Florida courts).
161. See id. at 272 (noting that the FCRA does not differentiate between “sex” and
“gender”).
162. See id. at 273 (“The Florida Civil Rights Act is patterned after Title VII, and therefore
federal case law regarding Title VII is applicable.” (quoting Castleberry v. Edward M.
Chadbourne, Inc., 810 So. 2d 1028, 1030 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002))).
163. Id. at 271–74.
164. See id. at 272 n.13.
165. Id. at 274–75 (Bilbrey, J., concurring).
166. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2101–37.2804 (2022).
167. Id. § 37.2302(a).
168. See Rouch World, LLC v. Mich. Dep’t of C.R., No. 20-000145-MZ, slip op. at 3
(Mich. Ct. Cl. Dec. 7, 2020), appeal granted, 961 N.W.2d 153 (Mich. 2021) (mem.).
169. 497 N.W.2d 216 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), appeal denied, 570 N.W.2d 655 (Mich.
1997).
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of “sex” in the ELCRA.170 However, Barbour did not address whether
gender identity is included under “sex.”171
Since Bostock, two Michigan courts have considered whether sex
discrimination includes gender identity discrimination.172 In Rouch World,
LLC v. Michigan Department of Civil Rights,173 the court assessed whether
the Michigan Department of Civil Rights’s Interpretive Statement 2018-1,
which construed the ELCRA’s prohibition against sex discrimination to
include both sexual orientation and gender identity,174 was valid under
Michigan law.175 Under Barbour, the court concluded that its interpretation
regarding sexual orientation was invalid, although it left open the possibility
that Barbour was “no longer valid” in light of Bostock.176 The Rouch World
court also concluded, however, that gender identity discrimination was
properly included under the ELCRA.177 In reaching that conclusion, the
court noted that the Michigan Supreme Court—in remanding a related case,
People v. Rogers178—had ordered the lower court to reconsider their decision
in light of Bostock.179 Thus, because of the Michigan Supreme Court’s
directive in Rogers, the Rouch World court followed Bostock’s reasoning in
its own case and held that gender identity discrimination was included under
the ELCRA.180 After the trial court’s decision in Rouch World, the Michigan
Department of Civil Rights appealed directly to the Michigan Supreme Court
on the issue of whether the ELCRA applied to discrimination based on sexual
orientation—essentially asking the court to overturn Barbour.181 The
Michigan Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal.182
170. Id. at 217–18.
171. Rouch World, slip op. at 4.
172. The first case addressed public accommodations under the ELCRA. See Rouch World,
slip op. at 2–3. The second line of cases interpreted an ethnic-intimidation criminal statute
that prohibited crimes motivated by animus based on “gender.” See infra Part II.C.
173. No. 20-000145-MZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. Dec. 7, 2020), appeal granted, 961 N.W.2d 153
(Mich. 2021) (mem.).
174. Mich. C.R. Comm’n, The Meaning of “Sex” in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act
(Act 453 of 1976) (May 21, 2018), https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/
mdcr/mcrc/interpretive-statements/2018/meaning-of-sex.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8PU5HXDF].
175. Rouch World, slip op. at 2–3.
176. Id. at 4. The Rouch World court concluded that it must follow Barbour until a higher
Michigan court overturns it, even if they “believe that it was wrongly decided or has become
obsolete.” See id. (quoting In re AGD, 933 N.W.2d 751, 755 (Mich. Ct. App. 2019)).
177. Id. at 7.
178. 951 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 2020), vacated, 950 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 2020) (mem.).
179. Rouch World, slip op. at 5 (“[T]he [Michigan] Supreme Court’s order directing that
Court to reconsider its decision in light of Bostock sheds at least some light on whether this
Court should consider Bostock when interpreting the ELCRA.”). See infra Part II.C for a
discussion of the Rogers case.
180. See Rouch World, slip op. at 5–7.
181. See Rouch World, LLC v. Mich. Dep’t of C.R., 961 N.W.2d 153, 153 (Mich. 2021)
(mem.).
182. Id. Oral argument for the appeal was held on March 2, 2022. See Schedule of Oral
Arguments—March 2022 Session, MICH. SUP. CT., https://www.courts.michigan.gov/
49059f/siteassets/case-documents/calendarcall/2022_03_schedule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7C2R-57KL] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
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C. Ethnic-Intimidation Cases
Before Rouch World, another Michigan court weighed in on Bostock’s
applicability to state law for an ethnic-intimidation statute that prohibited
intimidation or harassment of another person because of, inter alia, their
“gender.”183 In Rogers, the defendant allegedly harassed a transgender
woman because of her gender identity and threatened her with a gun.184 The
defendant was charged under an ethnic-intimidation statute,185 which
prohibited crimes motivated by animus “because of . . . gender.”186 Both the
Michigan trial court and intermediate appellate court187 originally held that
the statute did not include crimes motivated by animus against transgender
people,188 but on appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of Bostock.189 On remand, the appellate
court reversed, interpreting the ethnic-intimidation statute in line with
Bostock.190
Although the Michigan appellate court interpreted “gender” to include
transgender status, it also specified that Bostock “does not control the
outcome of this case,” although it should be afforded “respectful
consideration.”191 Ultimately, the court interpreted “gender” as synonymous
with “sex” as the term was used at the time of enactment.192 Thus, the
defendant’s alleged conduct was covered by the statute because “were it not
for the complainant’s biological sex (male), defendant would not have
harassed and intimidated her.”193
III. TO APPLY OR NOT TO APPLY: THE DEBATE IN STATE COURTS
In the aftermath of Bostock, state courts have employed the decision’s
reasoning to analogous state antidiscrimination laws to varying degrees. In
183. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.147b(1) (2022).
184. 951 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 2020), vacated, 950 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 2020)
(mem.).
185. See id. at 54–55.
186. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.147b(1) (2022).
187. Although the intermediate appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning, it
ultimately reached the same result. See Rogers, 951 N.W.2d at 53.
188. See id.
189. People v. Rogers, 950 N.W.2d 48, 48 (Mich. 2020) (mem.).
190. People v. Rogers, No. 346348, 2021 WL 3435544, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 5,
2021).
191. Id. at *6. Furthermore, the court noted:
[Federal] precedent cannot be allowed to rewrite Michigan law. The persuasiveness
of federal precedent can only be considered after the statutory differences between
Michigan and federal law have been fully assessed, and, of course, even when this
has been done and language in state statutes is compared to similar language in
federal statutes, federal precedent remains only as persuasive as the quality of its
analysis.
Id. at *5 (quoting Garg v. Macomb Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 696 N.W.2d 646, 658
(Mich. 2005)).
192. See id. at *6 (“We acknowledge that gender and sex are not now defined as
synonymous, although, as discussed, they were defined as such in 1988.”).
193. Id. The appellate court also noted that if one substituted “sex” for “gender” in the
statute, the language would be similar to that of Title VII. Id.

2022] SMALL GESTURES AND UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES

2411

doing so, these courts have grappled with issues of statutory interpretation,
principles of federalism, and public policy.194 This part discusses the main
justifications for and against applying Bostock to state antidiscrimination
laws. Some arguments are primarily derived from scholarly commentary
about state antidiscrimination law in general,195 whereas others come from
Bostock’s majority and dissenting opinions.
A. Bostock Is Applicable to State Statutes
Three state courts that have addressed the issue of Bostock’s applicability
have concluded that state antidiscrimination statutes should be interpreted in
line with federal law.196 This section addresses three main reasons—
articulated by both scholars and state courts—for why federal and state
antidiscrimination law should be consistent in this area. Part III.A.1
examines the intentions of state legislatures. Part III.A.2 discusses the
persuasiveness of the textualist roots of Bostock. Finally, Part III.A.3
addresses reasons of public policy, including uniformity in the law.
1. The Intentions of State Legislatures
The intent of a legislature, especially when explicitly stated in the statutory
text, has often been considered persuasive for courts interpreting that
statute.197 Although some states passed antidiscrimination statutes before the
1964 Act,198 the concept of antidiscrimination laws—particularly ones that
address sex-based discrimination—was a relatively new phenomenon in the
1960s.199 After federal antidiscrimination statutes were passed, similar
statutes flooded the states.200 State statutes that explicitly require “forced
consistency” with federal law are relatively rare.201 However, the historical
link and dialogue between federal and state antidiscrimination law can be a
strong indicator of state legislative intent.202 The 1964 Act and the state
statutes that preceded it follow a common federalist trend: “Sometimes,

194. See infra Parts III.A–B.
195. Because much of the scholarship in this area is focused on employment law, this part
will frequently use employment law as representative of antidiscrimination law in general. See
supra note 20.
196. See supra Part II (discussing Tarrant County, Rouch World, and Rogers).
197. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 60 (2012) (“The cardinal rule of statutory construction
is to effectuate legislative intent . . . .”); see also id. § 71 (“To determine the legislature’s
intent . . . the court may properly consider not just the statute’s language but also the purpose
and necessity for the law.”).
198. See supra note 32.
199. See Long, supra note 25.
200. Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use
and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 91 (2002).
201. Long, supra note 25.
202. See Sperino, supra note 32, at 586 (“In many instances, there are strong textual and
historical ties regarding provisions of state and federal law where similar treatment would be
appropriate.”); see also Goldfarb, supra note 200, at 88–89 (arguing that redundancy between
federal and state antidiscrimination laws is not only inevitable but also desirable in a federalist
system).
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federal civil rights legislation fills a vacuum left by state legislative inaction,
and states then follow suit by enacting their own versions of the federal
statute.”203 Many states have acknowledged this historic link between
federal and state antidiscrimination law, either legislatively or judicially.204
Currently, fourteen states do not have full statutory protections for LGBTQ+
people but do have statutes with identical key language to Title VII; 205 of
those fourteen states, eleven have some sort of “signal” from the state
legislature or judicial precedent that state courts should look to federal law
for guidance.206
As a case in point, in Tarrant County, the Texas appellate court relied on
an explicit purpose statutory provision, stating that the statute was intended
to execute the policies of Title VII.207 With no precedent from other Texas
courts on the issue, the Tarrant County court therefore looked to federal law,
with Bostock being directly on point.208 Similarly, although it did not reach
the issue in its holding, the Ohio court in Nance acknowledged long-standing
Ohio case law, stating that federal antidiscrimination laws are usually
relevant when interpreting Ohio state antidiscrimination laws.209 Thus, it is
important for state courts to look to legislative intent when interpreting state
203. Goldfarb, supra note 200, at 90.
204. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
205. For these purposes, “identical language” means that the state statute includes the key
interpretive language that the Bostock Court relied on: “because of,” “sex,” and
“discrimination.” The fourteen states are as follows: Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (2021); GA.
CODE ANN. § 45-19-29 (2021); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5909 (West 2021); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1009 (West 2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040(1)(a) (West 2021); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:332 (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03(1)
(2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (West 2021); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 955(a)
(West 2022); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-80(A) (2022); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-10 (2021);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-401(a) (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105(a)(i) (2021).
206. This may take either the form of an explicit purpose provision in the statute or a
declaration from a high-level state court. See supra notes 132, 148–49, 179, 187–90 and
accompanying text. The eleven states are as follows: Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee.
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5901(1) (West 2021) (identifying the execution of the 1964 Act
as the general purpose of the statute); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.020(1)(a) (West 2021)
(same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-100 (2021) (limiting the application of the statute to persons
covered by federal antidiscrimination law); Davis v. Sheraton Soc’y Hill Hotel, 907 F. Supp.
896, 899 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (applying state employment antidiscrimination law in accordance
with Title VII); Higdon v. Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc., 673 P.2d 907, 909–10 n.3 (Ariz.
1983) (finding Title VII case law to be persuasive in interpreting state law); Ga. Dep’t of Hum.
Res. v. Montgomery, 284 S.E.2d 263, 265 (Ga. 1981) (same); McCabe v. Johnson Cnty., Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs, 615 P.2d 780, 783 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (same); Motton v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 900 So.2d 901, 909 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (looking to federal precedent to interpret
state antidiscrimination laws); Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Home v. Agnew, 590 N.W.2d 688,
693 (Neb. 1999) (same); Huck v. McCain Foods, 479 N.W.2d 167, 169 (S.D. 1991) (noting
that the state law is “comparable” to Title VII); Campbell v. Fla. Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26,
31 (Tenn. 1996) (applying the same analysis under both state and federal antidiscrimination
law).
207. See supra notes 132, 139, 142 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
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laws; in many cases, the legislature’s intent was to explicitly link state law
with the analogous federal act.210
2. Textualism and Strengthening the Link Between Title VII and Similarly
Worded Statutes
Textualism—the judicial theory of primarily or solely analyzing the text
to interpret a statute—has become the core of modern statutory
interpretation.211 Justice Kagan once famously said, “[W]e’re all textualists
now.”212 Textualism purports to offer a “politically neutral” method of
statutory interpretation by focusing only on the text of the statute.213
However, textualism continues to be associated with a conservative judicial
ideology typically espoused by conservative judges.214
The self-proclaimed textualist nature of Bostock’s reasoning may be
compelling for state courts, especially in more conservative states. In the
majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch focused almost solely on the text of Title
VII,215 as well as Title VII case law.216 Almost the entire analysis rested on
four words in the statute: “because of,” “sex,” and “discrimination.”217
Technically, Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning in Bostock could apply to any
analogous statute with identical language.218 There was very little in the
opinion that was specific to Title VII itself or to Title VII federal case law.219
Consequently, Bostock may be particularly relevant and applicable to state
statutes with wording identical to Title VII.
For example, Texas’s, Ohio’s, and Michigan’s statutes have identical
language when it comes to those four words.220 The Tarrant County court
specifically identified the similarity between Title VII and the Texas
antidiscrimination statute as a reason for applying Bostock.221 The Rouch
World court in Michigan also identified Title VII as a provision “analogous”

210. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
211. See O’Scannlain, supra note 100, at 306.
212. See id. at 304.
213. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 849, 851 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 115).
214. See id. But see Grove, supra note 117, at 270 (arguing that “formalistic textualism,”
as seen in Bostock, may constrain judges’ political leanings and enhance judicial legitimacy).
215. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.
217. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739–41 (2020); Spindelman, supra
note 23, at 563–66.
218. See supra notes 100–04, 113–17 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
textualist analysis of Title VII and its rejection of extratextualist sources like legislative
history).
219. See Spindelman, supra note 23, at 566 (noting how Bostock wraps up its reasoning
without departing too meaningfully from Title VII’s text). But see id. at 564 (“[J]udicial
precedent is doing meaningful work at Bostock’s ostensibly textualist foundations.”).
220. See supra notes 131, 144, 167 and accompanying text. Florida’s statute has slightly
different language: “on the ground of . . . sex.” See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
221. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist. v. Sims, 621 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. App. 2021).
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to their state antidiscrimination law.222 Furthermore, of the twenty-nine
states that do not have full statutory protections for LGBTQ+ people,223
fourteen states have employment discrimination statutes with key language
identical to Title VII.224
3. Uniformity and Certainty as Compelling Legal Interests
Public policy arguments for uniformity and federal deference may also
play a role in state courts’ decision-making.225 Some scholars maintain that
reputational concerns for state judges argue in favor of deferring to federal
courts, even when interpreting state law.226 In addition, state courts have
often stated that uniformity in antidiscrimination law—on both the federal
and state levels—is a compelling reason to defer to federal law.227 Not only
can uniformity reduce uncertainty for potential plaintiffs and defendants,228
but it also eases the burden on state and federal judges, who are often
interpreting state law concurrently.229 With their much larger caseload,230 it
is far easier for state courts to look to federal precedent for guidance than to
interpret state law completely independently.231 Furthermore, there is also a
sense that civil rights, in particular, is an area of the law where states should
follow the federal government’s lead,232 especially given the history of U.S.
civil rights law233: “If a right is fundamental to our national conception of
justice, it must not disappear or diminish as one crosses state lines.”234
As an example of this concern for uniformity, in Rouch World, the
Michigan court implied that inconsistency in Michigan public
accommodations law was detrimental to the state.235 Under Barbour—the
pre-Bostock state precedent—“sex” does not include sexual orientation in

222. Rouch World, LLC v. Mich. Dep’t of C.R., No. 20-000145-MZ, slip op. at 4–5 (Mich.
Ct. Cl. Dec. 7, 2020), appeal granted, 961 N.W.2d 153 (Mich. 2021) (mem.).
223. See supra note 58.
224. See supra note 205 (listing these statutes).
225. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 389 A.2d 465, 478 (N.J. 1978)
(“[W]here [federal antidiscrimination standards] are useful and fair, it is in the best interests
of everyone concerned to have some uniformity in the law.”); Winn v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 484 A.2d 392, 404 (Pa. 1984) (noting that the Pennsylvania antidiscrimination statute
should be construed with federal law in mind because of “the interest [in] . . . uniformity and
predictability”); W. Va. Univ. v. Decker, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265 (W. Va. 1994) (stating that
uniformity in antidiscrimination law is “valuable per se”).
228. Cf. Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK.
L. REV. 1057, 1099–100 (1989) (discussing the benefits and disadvantages of federal-state
uniformity in § 1983 actions).
229. See Sperino, supra note 32, at 587; see also Long, supra note 25, at 479 (noting that
employment discrimination cases are much more common in federal court than in state court).
230. Long, supra note 25, at 479.
231. See Sperino, supra note 32, at 586–87.
232. See Goldfarb, supra note 200, at 143–46.
233. See supra Part I.A and note 33.
234. Goldfarb, supra note 200, at 143.
235. See supra notes 173–82 and accompanying text.
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Michigan’s antidiscrimination statute.236 But the Rouch World court
interpreted the same provision to include gender identity.237 Thus, Michigan
currently treats sexual orientation and gender identity differently, even
though they are included under the same statutory definition (“sex”). With
Barbour’s reasoning based on decades-old statutory interpretation and Rouch
World’s reasoning based on analogous federal law, there is now doubt in
Michigan as to how LGBTQ+ people are treated under the ELCRA.238 In
light of this, the Rouch World court cast doubt on the validity of the Barbour
precedent after Bostock.239
B. Bostock Is Irrelevant to State Law
Alternatively, some argue that Bostock’s reasoning is inapplicable when
interpreting state antidiscrimination laws. One of the primary arguments in
favor of this position is the federalist principle of state independence from
the federal government.240 In addition, some courts may not find the
textualist reasoning of Bostock compelling.241 Part III.B.1 addresses the
argument that states should independently interpret their own statutes in
accordance with federalist principles. Part III.B.2 discusses the flaws in
Bostock’s textualism and addresses how these flaws could make the
decision’s reasoning less compelling to state courts.
1. Federalism and the Independence of the States
Federalism is the concept of separation of powers between the federal
government and state governments.242 With some exceptions,243 state
legislatures and courts are the ultimate determiners of state law.244 Although
a sense of deference to federal law among state judges is strong,245 the sense
of independence from federal courts is probably equally as strong.246
236. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text.
240. See People v. Rogers, No. 346348, 2021 WL 3435544, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 5,
2021) (“[T]he federal interpretation of an analogous federal statute would not control our
interpretation of a Michigan statute, even under the most expansive reading of the U.S.
Constitution’s supremacy clause.”). See generally Kevin J. Koai, Note, Judicial Federalism
and Causation in State Employment Discrimination Statutes, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 763 (2019)
(arguing that state courts should interpret employment discrimination law independently from
federal courts).
241. See generally Spindelman, supra note 23.
242. Goldfarb, supra note 200, at 59.
243. For instance, if a state law “defines” a federal statutory or constitutional right, then
federal courts may have the ability to interpret that state law. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
105–06 (2000) (overturning the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Florida state
constitution).
244. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (noting that state courts are the
“ultimate expositors of state law”).
245. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
246. See James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power:
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1063 (2003) (arguing
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Proponents of federalism argue, among other things, that state
independence “encourage[s] a dialogue” between federal and state courts
about antidiscrimination law.247 New innovations in civil rights law have
often emerged as a result of a “back-and-forth” between Congress and the
states.248 Justice Louis Brandeis once famously noted: “It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”249 The metaphor of
states as democratic laboratories has persisted for almost one hundred
years250 and has provided more support for political and legal innovation
through state independence.251
Independent state analyses of state statutes may also “reflect[] the unique
and shared values within an individual state.”252 Individual states have their
own histories, ideologies, cultures, and areas of social and economic
expertise, which affect their approaches to political problems.253 As long as
these state laws do not violate the U.S. Constitution or federal law,254
proponents of federalism argue that state legislatures and courts should be
allowed to legislate and interpret as they wish.255
In Love v. Young, the plurality made no explicit mention of Bostock in its
denial of the plaintiff’s claim, despite the court’s request for the parties to
submit briefs on the case’s applicability.256 The omission of Bostock from
the opinion—despite the heavy reliance on the case by the dissent257 and the

that some state courts seem to only diverge from federal interpretations to “fight the outcome
dictated by federal law”); see also Long, supra note 25, at 480–81 (discussing the “new
judicial federalism” of the 1970s, in which state courts interpreted state constitutions to
provide more protections than the U.S. Constitution).
247. Long, supra note 25, at 480; see also Gardner, supra note 246, at 1008–09 (discussing
the historical overlap of federal and state governments in exercising political power).
248. See Goldfarb, supra note 200, at 87.
249. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
251. See Goldfarb, supra note 200, at 97–98.
252. Long, supra note 25, at 480.
253. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581–83 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing how
different states may approach a political problem “where the best solution is far from clear”).
But see generally Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism,
Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003)
(arguing that the Civil War and Reconstruction amendments fundamentally changed the
balance of power between the federal government and the states, making antebellum federalist
principles anachronistic).
254. See United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809) (“If the legislatures of
the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and
destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the [C]onstitution itself becomes a solemn
mockery . . . .”).
255. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–82 (1992).
256. 320 So. 3d 259, 260 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
257. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text.
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parties in their briefs258—can be viewed as an implicit rejection of Bostock’s
applicability to the Florida antidiscrimination statute.
In People v. Rogers, the Michigan appellate court initially rejected the
usefulness of Bostock and federal law in general when interpreting Michigan
state law.259 Although the appellate court reversed on remand to be
consistent with Bostock,260 the court clarified that federal precedent could
not rewrite Michigan law.261 They were bound by precedent from the
Michigan Supreme Court, and in analyzing Michigan law, they determined
that Bostock “[did] not control the outcome of th[e] case.”262
The power of states to enact and interpret their own laws, independent of
federal law, is an important characteristic of American democracy.263 It is
partially due to this independence—as well as the efforts of LGBTQ+
activists—that same-sex marriage was legalized first throughout the states
and then nationwide.264 State sovereignty is a basic tenet of the dynamic
between the national government, states, and their citizens.265 For this
reason, the federalist argument may be compelling to state judges
interpreting state antidiscrimination laws.
2. The Flawed Textualism of Bostock
Some scholars also argue that Bostock’s reasoning is not as textualist as
the majority claimed.266 For instance, Professor Marc Spindelman posits that
extratextual federal precedent on Title VII played a significant role in
Bostock’s reasoning,267 making it potentially inapplicable to other
statutes.268 Although Bostock’s logic may justify the possibility of
interpreting Title VII to include anti-LGBTQ+ discrimination, some critics
argue that it does not adequately justify its interpretive choice that Title VII

258. See generally Supplemental Brief of Appellant, Love v. Young, 320 So. 3d 259 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2021) (No. 1D18-2844).
259. See supra notes 184–93 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
261. People v. Rogers, No. 346348, 2021 WL 3435544, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 5,
2021).
262. Id.
263. See Goldfarb, supra note 200, at 58–61.
264. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
265. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–82 (1992).
266. See, e.g., Spindelman, supra note 23, at 556–57 (“Bostock is, in a way, the
straightforward textualist statutory interpretation decision it claims to be—but it is also not
that.”); Eric Segall, A Different View About Chief Justice Roberts and this Year’s Term: The
Return of O’Connorism, DORF ON L. (July 17, 2020), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2020/07/adifferent-view-about-chief-justice.html [https://perma.cc/P9BN-N5HU] (questioning the
textualist basis for Bostock and instead framing the decision as a debate between “values”).
267. See Spindelman, supra note 23, at 571 (discussing how the Bostock majority invokes
federal precedent about sex discrimination based on motherhood and sexual harassment as
support for their decision).
268. See People v. Rogers, No. 346348, 2021 WL 3435544, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 5,
2021) (noting the differences between Title VII and the Michigan statute at issue).
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must be interpreted that way.269 Instead, Bostock implicitly relied on several
extratextual sources, including federal Title VII case law and the Supreme
Court’s constitutional law jurisprudence on LGBTQ+ issues.270
For instance, the Bostock Court cited to several other Title VII cases that
held that sexual harassment and discrimination based on motherhood both
violate Title VII.271
These precedents are not binding on state
antidiscrimination laws, and may not even be persuasive, since some state
laws have separate statutory provisions forbidding sexual harassment and
discrimination based on parenthood.272
In addition, Professor Spindelman argues that the Bostock Court was
heavily influenced by the Supreme Court’s line of constitutional law cases
on LGBTQ+ issues,273 from Romer to Obergefell v. Hodges.274 In
interpreting Title VII, he argues, the Bostock Court “affirms that principles
of constitutional justice, as they have developed, remain principles of legal
justice, too.”275 The Bostock Court extracted the constitutional principle of
LGBTQ+ equality under the law—evident from its own precedents over the
past forty years—and applied it to a federal statute.276 These constitutional
norms and principles are binding on states, but they cannot be explicitly
found in a textualist approach to interpreting Title VII. Thus, state courts
interpreting similarly worded state statutes may find Bostock’s reasoning to
be unpersuasive because of these extratextual factors at play in the decision.
IV. A PATH FORWARD FOR STATE COURTS AFTER BOSTOCK
As time passes, more state courts will begin to grapple with the issue of
Bostock’s applicability to their own antidiscrimination statutes.277 These
state courts will be faced with differing statutes, with diverse histories and
varying judicial precedent. Despite these distinctions, however, Bostock
offers a powerful basis for state courts to expand protections for LGBTQ+
Americans beyond what federal law may provide.
This part argues that state courts should apply Bostock’s reasoning when
interpreting state antidiscrimination statutes, which would extend significant
protections for LGBTQ+ Americans. Part IV.A argues that Bostock’s
reasoning should be compelling to state judges specifically because of its
textualist identity. Part IV.B rebuts the contention that principles of
269. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1757 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“The Court attempts to prove . . . not merely that the terms of Title VII can be interpreted that
way, but that they cannot reasonably be interpreted any other way.”); Spindelman, supra note
23, at 568.
270. See Spindelman, supra note 23, at 570–85.
271. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747.
272. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 2021) (banning employment
discrimination based on familial status).
273. See Spindelman, supra note 23, at 586–612.
274. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
275. Spindelman, supra note 23, at 608.
276. See id. at 608–09.
277. In the nearly two years since Bostock was handed down, at least five state courts have
confronted the issue. See supra Part II.
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federalism should outweigh Bostock’s influence on state courts. Finally, Part
IV.C acknowledges the limitations of using Bostock as a basis for sexual
orientation and gender identity antidiscrimination law, but nevertheless
concludes that the practical benefits of expanding LGBTQ+ rights far
outweigh the disadvantages.
A. The Persuasiveness of Bostock in the Age of Textualism
Many states, because of legal history and legislative intent, have
antidiscrimination statutes with wording very similar, if not identical, to their
federal counterparts.278 The common textual differences between federal
and state statutes—mainly the “omnibus” structure of state law compared to
scattered federal laws,279 as well as the number of characteristics
protected280—are irrelevant to the core of Bostock’s textualist reasoning. In
examining the text of Title VII, the Bostock Court’s analysis focused almost
solely on the framework of four words: “because of,” “sex,” and
“discrimination.”281 Although Bostock is admittedly influenced by statutory
and constitutional precedent,282 the binary logic of the decision remains: if
an employer has two otherwise identical employees—one male and one
female, who are both married to men—and the employer fires the male
employee—but not the female employee—because of his sexual orientation,
then that employer has technically discriminated against the male employee
because of that employee’s sex.283 This reasoning would apply to any statute
with the phrase “because of . . . sex.”284 It may be formalistic, literalist, or
even “wooden,”285 but for judges in an age of textualism, it is nevertheless
compelling,286 especially since many state statutes have similar, if not
identical, language.287
State courts that (1) are interpreting statutes with key language identical to
Title VII288 and that (2) have some signal from the state legislature or a higher
court about using federal law for guidance289 should especially adopt Bostock
as a gloss on their own antidiscrimination statutes. In these states, the
278. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 271–76 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 103–11 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
285. Spindelman, supra note 23, at 567; see also Grove, supra note 117, at 269–70 (arguing
that “formalistic textualism” may be so limiting that it constrains judicial discretion, and thus,
enhances judicial legitimacy).
286. See, e.g., Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist. v. Sims, 621 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tex. App. 2021)
(“When the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations
suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law . . . .” (quoting Bostock v.
Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020))).
287. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 205 and accompanying text for the list of states with statutes that have
key language identical to Title VII.
289. See supra note 206 and accompanying text for the list of states with these “signals” to
interpret state statutes in line with federal law.
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textualist argument is the most compelling,290 and the statutes should be
prime targets for a Bostock-type argument, which has succeeded in Texas291
and which seems primed to succeed in Michigan.292
In addition, the political background of Bostock’s 6–3 decision—
specifically its authorship by Justice Gorsuch—should be compelling to
conservative state judges. Despite Justice Alito’s objections in his dissent,293
Bostock not only presents itself as a textualist opinion294 but also has been
largely depicted as such in political and legal discourse.295 Justice Gorsuch
has been characterized, either positively or negatively, as Justice Antonin
Scalia’s textualist successor on an already conservative Supreme Court.296
His authorship of a decision that was a significant victory for progressive
LGBTQ+ activists297 should be compelling in and of itself to state courts,
especially courts in states without explicit LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination
protections, which tend to be more conservative.298 Conservative state courts
may be hesitant to interpret a statute to include antidiscrimination protections
for LGBTQ+ people,299 especially with such vigorous dissents from other
conservative textualists like Justice Alito.300 But ultimately, these dissents
fall flat by invoking traditionally anti-textualist methods of statutory
interpretation, such as historical congressional intent.301 On the other hand,
Bostock successfully assuages textualist fears by repeatedly stating that a
court should only be concerned with the law as it is.302 By using a
conservative tool of statutory interpretation to produce a progressive and

290. See, e.g., supra notes 130–49, 173–80 and accompanying text (discussing the success
of Bostock-type arguments in Texas and Michigan).
291. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
296. See Jonathan Skrmetti, Symposium: The Triumph of Textualism: “Only the Written
Word Is the Law,” SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2020, 9:04 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2020/06/symposium-the-triumph-of-textualism-only-the-written-word-is-the-law/
[https://perma.cc/7UUJ-895Z].
297. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1837 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“Notwithstanding my concern about the Court’s transgression of the
Constitution’s separation of powers, it is appropriate to acknowledge the important victory
achieved today by gay and lesbian Americans.”).
298. See supra note 58 for the complete list of states that do not have full statutory
antidiscrimination protections for LGBTQ+ people.
299. See Love v. Young, 320 So. 3d 259, 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) (“The trial court
did not decide whether the FCRA extends to gender identity, but rather applied an ‘even-if’
analysis . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist. v. Sims, 621 S.W.3d 323,
328–29 (Tex. App. 2021) (quoting Bostock’s textualist reasoning and acknowledgement that
its holding would be unexpected to the drafters of the 1964 Act).
300. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
301. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1767–74 (Alito, J., dissenting); Conway, supra note 117
(discussing how Bostock’s majority lives up to textualist ideals, while its dissenting opinions
“[come] up short” by invoking the “social context in which a statute was enacted”); Grove,
supra note 117, at 294–95 (discussing the subjectivity of the dissenting justices’ analyses
when compared to the majority’s analysis).
302. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
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liberal outcome, Justice Gorsuch has “given permission” to textualist state
judges to interpret their states’ antidiscrimination statutes similarly,303 even
if those state legislatures are more conservative.304
B. Federalist Principles Should Not Limit States’ Abilities to Adopt
Federal Law
Proponents of federalism argue that states’ interpretations of state laws
should be independent from federal law to preserve the historic sovereignty
of the states,305 encourage innovation in the law,306 and reflect political
differences between different states.307 But these arguments are inapplicable
to the current political climate, as well as the issue of LGBTQ+
discrimination.
First and foremost, explicit statutory text—as well as the historical and
linguistic links between state and federal antidiscrimination statutes—often
demonstrates a legislative intent to mirror Title VII.308 Examining legislative
intent, whether derived through the text of the statute or through legislative
history, is an accepted method of statutory interpretation.309 Because many
state antidiscrimination statutes were passed pursuant to the 1964 Act, the
statutes are intentionally worded very similarly.310 Some state legislatures,
like Texas’s, included an explicit directive to interpret their state statutes in
line with federal law.311 Now that Bostock has expanded the coverage of
Title VII, state courts with statutory provisions like Texas’s should interpret
their statutes in line with the decision. In fact, it would be disregarding the
will of the state legislature not to do so.
In addition, state courts following Bostock as a matter of statutory
interpretation do not violate federalist doctrines such as the
anti-commandeering principle.312
The anti-commandeering principle
forbids the federal government from “commandeering” state governments
and actors to impose federal law.313 However, the anti-commandeering
principle does not normally apply to state courts because the U.S.
Constitution specifically requires state courts to enforce federal law.314
303. For example, two state courts that have explicitly adopted Bostock’s reasoning quoted
explicitly textualist excerpts from Bostock. See Tarrant County, 621 S.W.3d at 329 (quoting
an excerpt from Bostock focusing on textualist interpretation); Rouch World, LLC v. Mich.
Dep’t of C.R., No. 20-000145-MZ, slip op. at 6 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Dec. 7, 2020) (discussing
Bostock’s textualist logic), appeal granted, 961 N.W.2d 153 (Mich. 2021) (mem.).
304. See infra notes 346–47 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 263–65 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 247–51 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 252–55 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
309. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1776 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
310. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
312. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (explaining the
anti-commandeering principle).
313. See Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 158, 163–64 (2001).
314. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Furthermore, Bostock does not command state courts to interpret state
statutory uses of “sex” to include sexual orientation and gender identity, nor
is there any precedential effect.315 State courts are free to disagree, as the
Florida court in Love did.316
Furthermore, while it is true that the adoption of Bostock’s reasoning by
state courts may not produce a “dialogue” between federal and state
governments on LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination law,317 this lack of dialogue
would not stifle innovation among the states. With the current gridlock in
Congress, the proposed federal Equality Act318—which would, among other
things, codify Bostock’s holding in statutory federal law—is not close to
becoming law.319 Any federal statutory protections for LGBTQ+ people are
probably far in the future. With Congress silent on this issue, the primary
battleground for LGBTQ+ civil rights will continue to be in federal320 and
state courts,321 as well as in state and local legislatures,322 just as the
same-sex marriage movement played out.323 Achieving uniformity between
federal and state antidiscrimination laws by adopting Bostock in state courts
is a crucial step toward legal equality,324 and it does not erase the dialogue
between the states regarding the details of antidiscrimination laws, such as
remedies and procedural mechanisms.325 State antidiscrimination statutes
have meaningful differences in how they address and remedy discrimination
claims,326 and these differences can continue to foster an innovative dialogue
about antidiscrimination law among the states.327
C. An Imperfect Solution: Founding LGBTQ+ Legal Equality in
Preexisting Frameworks
Finally, the value of consistency and securing universal legal protections
for LGBTQ+ people supports the expansive application of Bostock.328
Between federal and state civil rights law, LGBTQ+ people have inconsistent
315. There is, of course, precedential effect on state courts adjudicating Title VII claims.
316. See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 247–51 and accompanying text.
318. H.R. 5, 117th Cong. (as passed by House, Feb. 25, 2021).
319. See Danielle Kurtzleben, House Passes the Equality Act: Here’s What It Would Do,
NPR (Feb. 24, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/24/969591569/house-to-voteon-equality-act-heres-what-the-law-would-do [https://perma.cc/88KJ-W6CE].
320. See LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 41, at 1–2, 4.
321. See State Courts and the Rights of LGBT People and People Living with HIV, LAMBDA
LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/node/42671 [https://perma.cc/K2SH-VWKD] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2022).
322. See Matt Lavietes, As States Pursue a Wave of Anti-LGBTQ Laws, Cities Move in the
Opposite Direction, NBC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2021, 9:20 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/nbcout/out-politics-and-policy/states-pursue-wave-anti-lgbtq-laws-cities-move-directionrcna5890 [https://perma.cc/W57W-8KRS].
323. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part III.A.3.
325. See supra notes 75–82 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 75–82 and accompanying text.
327. See Drummonds, supra note 75, at 156 (describing state innovations in the remedial
field as “pioneering” and “leading-edge”).
328. See infra notes 329–33 and accompanying text.
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and unpredictable legal protections.329 For instance, in a state without
LGBTQ+ employment protections, large employers like Walmart or Amazon
are forbidden from discriminating based on sexual orientation or gender
identity because of Bostock’s gloss on Title VII,330 yet a small bakery with
four to five employees can fire people for being LGBTQ+. This leaves
LGBTQ+ employees with uncertainty in the law and doubt as to whether
their employers can discriminate against them.331 Reducing uncertainty in
civil rights law is particularly important because it eases the burden on
minorities and other vulnerable groups332 who may already believe that they
are protected from employment discrimination in all instances because of
Bostock.333 Furthermore, now that all same-sex couples have the
constitutional right to marriage, antidiscrimination protections are
particularly important for LGBTQ+ people to resolve the “post-Obergefell
paradox”334—mainly that “a gay person could be legally married in any of
the fifty states on Saturday and fired from her job because of that marriage
on Monday.”335
The benefits of expanding Bostock to state antidiscrimination statutes are
significant.336 There are an estimated 3.6 million LGBTQ+ adults who
would gain further employment protections under state law expansions.337
And an estimated 4.3 million LGBTQ+ people over the age of thirteen would
gain protections in public accommodations.338 Bostock is admittedly an
imperfect opinion: its legal reasoning can feel “wooden” and overly
literalist.339 Furthermore, some feminist scholars have criticized Bostock for
failing to reckon with more inclusive legal theories, such as sex
stereotyping,340 and for focusing more on textualist statutory interpretation
329. See MALLORY, supra note 22, at 4–5; see, e.g., supra notes 235–38 and accompanying
text (discussing the uncertainty created by conflicting interpretations of the ELCRA in
Michigan).
330. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
331. See generally KERITH J. CONRON & SHOSHANA K. GOLDBERG, LGBT PEOPLE IN THE
US NOT PROTECTED BY STATE NON-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES (2020),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-ND-Protections-UpdateApr-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF8P-UQNZ] (surveying the fractured nature of state
protections for LGBTQ+ people).
332. See supra note 228 and accompanying text; cf. Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay
and Bisexual Rights and “The Civil Rights Agenda,” 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 33, 63–64
(1994) (discussing the conflict between statewide uniformity and the fragmented application
of civil rights in light of a discriminatory argument for statewide uniformity).
333. See Lewallen, supra note 77, at 817–18 (discussing how Title VII’s minimum
employee threshold creates uncertainty for victims of employment discrimination).
334. Ann C. McGinley et al., Feminist Perspectives on Bostock v. Clayton County, CONN.
L. REV. ONLINE, Dec. 2020, at 1, 6.
335. See id. (quoting Danielle D. Weatherby, Commentary: Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
OPINIONS 301, 302 (Ann C. McGinley & Nicole Buonocore Porter eds., 2020)).
336. MALLORY, supra note 22, at 1–2.
337. Id. at 1.
338. Id. at 2.
339. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
340. See McGinley et al., supra note 334, at 11–13. The authors argue that Bostock fails
in ignoring how discrimination against LGBTQ+ people is “highly gendered” because
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than on principles of legal equality for LGBTQ+ people.341 But the effects
of Bostock are undeniable: not only did the decision expand employment
protections for approximately eight million working LGBTQ+ adults,342 but
it also has the potential to expand legal protections to millions more
LGBTQ+ people.343 Moreover, Justice Gorsuch’s utilization of “formalistic
textualism”344 may pave the way for further progress in antidiscrimination
law by way of textualist legal arguments.345
Expanding antidiscrimination protections for LGBTQ+ people is a crucial
objective in the fight for legal and constitutional justice.346 A record number
of conservative state legislatures have enacted, or have attempted to enact,
anti-LGBTQ+ legislation in the past several years, in areas such as health
care, education, and public accommodation.347 This includes states with
courts that have chosen to apply Bostock to state antidiscrimination laws,
such as Texas and Michigan.348 These legislatures are probably not receptive

LGBTQ+ people are often seen as violating traditional gender norms. Id. at 13. Furthermore,
they argue that a decision based on the doctrine established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989)—that “discrimination for failure to conform to a gender stereotype is sex
discrimination under Title VII”—would have been more truthful and equitable. See McGinley
et al., supra note 334, at 13.
341. See Katherine Franke (@ProfKFranke), TWITTER (June 15, 2020, 1:42 PM),
https://twitter.com/profkfranke/status/1272585258601512962
[https://perma.cc/PAL8CT7D] (“Had #RBG written the #Bostock decision we would have seen strong language on
the fundamental importance of workplace equality as a national value.”); see also McGinley
et al., supra note 334, at 12.
342. CONRON & GOLDBERG, supra note 331, at 1.
343. See MALLORY, supra note 22, at 6.
344. See Grove, supra note 117 (defining formalistic textualism as “an approach that
instructs interpreters to carefully parse the statutory language, focusing on semantic context
and downplaying policy concerns or the practical (even monumental) consequences of the
case”).
345. See id. at 274 (noting how textualist constraints on judicial discretion “may be
valuable for politically vulnerable communities”); Eyer, supra note 117 (arguing that
textualism can and should be embraced by progressives).
346. Cf. Spindelman, supra note 23, at 606–09.
347. See Press Release, Wyatt Ronan, Hum. Rts. Campaign, 2021 Slated to Become Worst
Year for LGBTQ State Legislative Attacks as Unprecedented Number of States Poised to
Enact Record-Shattering Number of Anti-LGBTQ Measures into Law (Apr. 22, 2021),
https://www.hrc.org/press-releases/2021-slated-to-become-worst-year-for-lgbtq-statelegislative-attacks [https://perma.cc/7F76-ED29].
348. See Press Release, Wyatt Ronan, Hum. Rts. Campaign, BREAKING: 2021 Becomes
Record Year for Anti-Transgender Legislation (Mar. 13, 2021), https://www.hrc.org/pressreleases/breaking-2021-becomes-record-year-for-anti-transgender-legislation
[https://perma.cc/A2DT-SQE3] (discussing, among other laws, an anti-transgender medical
care bill in Texas and an anti-transgender sports bill in Michigan). In February 2022, Texas
also came under fire for Governor Greg Abbott’s order for state child welfare officials to start
investigating the parents of transgender children for child abuse if they seek gender-affirming
care for their children. Letter from Greg Abbott, Governor of Tex., to Jaime Masters, Comm’r
of Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. (Feb. 22, 2022), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/
press/O-MastersJaime202202221358.pdf [https://perma.cc/52VB-P2U4]; see Sneha Dey &
Karen Brooks Harper, Transgender Texas Kids Are Terrified After Governor Orders That
Parents Be Investigated for Child Abuse, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 28, 2022),
https://www.texastribune.org/2022/02/28/texas-transgender-child-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/
JZ2Q-SZSG].
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to adopting Bostock’s ruling as a statutory matter, so state courts may be the
only avenue for expanding these protections.349
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of the Bostock majority opinion, the majority noted that
“[t]hose who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have anticipated their
work would lead to this particular result . . . . [But o]nly the written word is
the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”350 The application of
Bostock to state antidiscrimination laws raises complex issues of statutory
interpretation, federalism, political pressures, and concepts of legal justice.
And the implications of Bostock for both federal and state law are extensive.
The five state court cases that have been litigated since June 2020
demonstrate that Bostock’s persuasiveness may spread beyond what the
Supreme Court itself may have foreseen or intended. Although Bostock
expanded employment protections for millions of LGBTQ+ adults, 3.6
million working people are still unprotected from employment
discrimination because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.351
While many state legislatures may continue to avoid the issue of LGBTQ+
civil rights, state courts must pick up the baton; Bostock, with its textualist
principles and judicial authority, gives them a path to expanding LGBTQ+
legal equality.

349. See William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 599
(1999) (“[G]ay litigants seeking to establish and vindicate civil rights have generally fared
better in state courts than they have in federal courts.”).
350. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
351. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.

